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SECURING EFFECTIVE WORK FROM LABOR
There is probably no more pressing and important managerial 
problem today, than the securing of effective work from labor. 
This article presents a review of a seasoned incentive wage system 
which has produced satisfactory results. The system is being 
operated by a concern employing at times over five thousand 
workers in three plants. The beneficial results obtained from its 
use have been increased production, decreased costs and higher 
wages.
Many managers have so abused some wage incentive systems 
that the term “ sweat-shop methods” for a long time has been used 
as a slogan by those workers who are opposed to any method of 
wage payment except day-work. Before the beginning of our last 
period of prosperity, scientific time study and rate setting were 
not rare, but in the opinion of many students of industrial manage­
ment they were used almost entirely for the benefit of the owners 
with very little consideration for workers.
Today, in the successful business, the co-operative spirit must 
prevail. The stockholder or capitalist, the executive and the worker 
should be compensated according to the services they render. The 
value of their services should be based upon economies effected, and 
standards of ability. The standards should be established fairly 
and equitably. The stockholder who has invested his capital ex­
pects, and should receive, a fair return. The executive who plans 
and effects savings so that the stockholder will receive his divi­
dends, should share in the economies he has helped to make. The 
employee, who by steady application and skill, increases production, 
reduces cost and automatically increases profits, should be rewarded 
in the proportion that his performance is to a standard or normal 
worker’s performance. The average employee will not contribute 
his best efforts unless he has a chance of being suitably compen­
sated.
While many profit-sharing methods are in use, it is almost im­
possible to make a fair division of profits, considering the effort and 
accomplishment of each worker as compared with his fellow- 
worker. Exceptionally efficient workers are apt to feel that they 
do not receive an equitable share in the profits in comparison with 
less skillful workers.
In the matter of wages it is the fairest method to compensate 
workers in proportion to their value as individuals. A company
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should make it worth while for the worker to produce to the extent 
of his ability, by recognizing his individuality through paying him 
for his achievements, as compared to the accomplishments of his 
fellow-workers. In this connection a standard should be set that 
the worker can reach and pass. Thus, if George Smith is naturally 
quicker and a better worker than Harry Rowe, then George should 
first be hourly rated higher than Harry, and should be rewarded 
by receiving extra remuneration, based upon the difference in time 
between Harry’s elapsed time on the job and his own. This differ­
ence, plus his margin of hourly rate, represents George’s superi­
ority as a worker. His additional monetary reward is the elapsed 
time difference multiplied by his hourly rate. In this case, Harry 
Rowe’s rate represents the standard, or 100% rate, which is the 
basis of the efficiency ratings in the plants under consideration 
which are later explained in this article.
C h o o s in g  t h e  I n c e n t i v e  S y s t e m
No unanimity of opinion exists as to which incentive wage 
system is generally the fairest and most satisfactory to the worker 
and at the same time nets the owners the greatest saving, consider­
ing the additional overhead expense necessary to run an incentive 
system.
Workers usually have an aversion to straight piece work. 
Changing rates with the changes in the labor market is difficult. 
If the wages in the labor market increase considerably, it is neces­
sary to revise all wage rates in fairness to the workers. On the 
other hand, if market wage rates decrease greatly, straight piece 
work rates should be revised downward in justice to the owners.
It is self-evident that rates of pay must be sufficient to reward 
the worker, equal to what he can get elsewhere where working con­
ditions are similar, and sufficiently high enough to encourage him 
to make a special effort.
One very serious objection to straight piece work is that the 
rates are too inflexible, and consequently unjust to owners and 
workers when conditions change from what they were when the 
rates were set, unless the rates are revised to meet existing condi­
tions. An attempt to change rates to meet changes in the labor 
market is costly and difficult. Furthermore, it takes considerable 
time.
It takes a very short time, however, to create a dissatisfied 
organization. If a worker thinks injustice has been done, it is 
always magnified by other interested parties.
Other conditions which more or less affect the wages of 
workers on straight piece work are the interferences caused by the 
variations in the “machinability” qualities of materials and the 
necessity of putting the product through machines which are not
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the most suitable for the work in hand. In periods of high produc­
tion these interferences with the regular routine are sometimes 
necessary in order to maintain the schedule of production and to 
balance output.
One incentive wage system used by the concern under consid­
eration is a guaranteed hourly rate with full allowance for time 
saved. This system is called “time work.” In order to use the 
method time studies are made and the best possible time is deter­
mined. To this best possible time is added 25% and the result is 
termed “allowed time” or “ standard 100% time.” Allowed time is 
set on every operation in terms of hundredths of hours per piece, 
and if the work is completed in less than the allowed time, the 
worker gains the entire difference between allowed time and actual 
time. If he meets with difficulties, or is not efficient enough to 
better the allowed time, he receives only his hourly rate. This 
method is obviously fair to the worker and to the company, the 
latter benefitting through increased production. The formula used 
for ascertaining the worker’s efficiency is allowed time divided by 
actual time. A worker who equals the allowed time is 100% effi­
cient, but earns no extra pay. A worker who equals the best pos­
sible time earns an extra 25% of his hourly rate, and is rated as 
125% efficient. A worker who betters the best possible time earns 
as extra compensation, an extra 25% plus the difference between 
allowed time and actual time, multiplied by his hourly rate. A 
worker who fails to meet the allowed time earns as much as the 
worker who equals it, since his hourly rate is guaranteed, but his 
efficienecy per cent. would show below 100 and his services would 
be dispensed with after he has received a sufficient number of low 
rankings in efficienecy. Hence, it is apparent that eventually only 
100% men or better would be employed if this system is strictly 
adhered to.
While the worker, under the wage system being described, who 
falls a little below 100% undoubtedly reduces costs, since he has 
made more of an endeavor to meet or better the allowed time than 
he did when there was no incentive, nevertheless, he earns no more 
than he had previously earned and his rating of less than 100% 
results in the company having a production shortage which is 
shown on a production shortage report. As a result additional 
work or overtime is necessary in order to keep production up to 
schedule.
The following table shows hypothetical performances of four 
workers rated at 50 cents per hour and illustrates the workings of 
the features of the wage system just discussed.
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A B C D
Best possible time  6.40 Hrs. 6.40 Hrs. 6.40 Hrs. 6.40 Hrs.
Allowed time  8 . 0 0  “ 8 . 0 0  “ 8 . 0 0  “ 8 . 0 0  “
Actual time V Job 8 . 0 0  “ 6.40 “ 5.00 “ 10.00 “
Time saved  0 1.60 “ 3.00 “
Extra earnings  $ . 0 0 $ .80 $1.50
Best possible time  1.60 Hrs. 3.84 Hrs.
Allowed time  2 . 0 0  “ 4.80 “
Actual time  Job 1.60 “ 3 .00 “Time saved  .40 “ 1.80 “
Extra earnings  $ .2 0 $ .90
Total allowed time 8.00 Hrs. 10.00 Hrs. 12.80 Hrs. 8 .00  Hrs.
Total actual time 8 . 0 0  “ 8 . 0 0  “ 8 . 0 0  “ 10.00 “
Hourly earnings $4.00 $4.00 $4.00 $4.00
Total time saved 0 2 . 0 0  “ 4 .80 “
Total extra earnings . 0 0 $1 . 0 0 $2.40
Total 8 -h.our earnings $4.00 $5.00 $6.40 $4 . 6 6
Efficiency per cent 100% 125% 160% 80%
These four workers, A, B, C and D in the above table, are given 
similar jobs with the same allowed time. “ A”  finishes his task in 
the time allowed. Neither he nor the company gains or loses. 
According to the rating he is 100% efficient. “ B” completes his 
task in the best possible time and earns 25% over his hourly rate 
and uses the time saved to make an additional 25% on another job. 
He is 125% efficient. “ C” accomplishes more than “B” . He sur­
passes the best possible time; earns 60% more than his hourly rate 
and continues to earn as much additional on his second job. He is 
160% efficient. “ D” takes 10 hours to do what “ A” has in 8, “ B” 
has in 6.40 and “ C” has in 5 hours. He is but 80% efficient.
W a g e  A g r e e m e n t
Before starting an incentive system of this description, the 
following agreement should be understood by the employees and 
rigidly adhered to by the company. Rates are set through scien­
tific time study with a view of allowing the worker the entire time 
saved between the allowed time (standard 100% time) and the 
actual time, the worker having the privilege of receiving a demon­
stration showing that the allowed time is attainable. A standard 
or allowed time rate once set and approved is not to be altered for 
a year, unless changes in tools or equipment are made. Further­
more, the rate is not to be changed under the latter conditions if 
the employee is responsible for or suggests an improvement in tools 
or tooling.
As a penalty for doing the work incorrectly the worker receives 
credit for only good parts which pass working drawing inspection.
In order that a worker’s record of performance may be made 
comparative and his ability and individuality easily recognized, an 
efficiency record must be kept of each job. A daily, weekly or 
monthly spoiled work deficiency record, an attendance efficiency 
record, and a deportment deficiency record and a tardiness defi­
ciency record, respectively, are also maintained.
R a t e  S e t t i n g
The success of the incentive system described in this article
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depends upon the setting of reliable standards and the desire of the 
worker to increase his earnings. He must be convinced at first 
that he has a good chance to better the standard, which must be 
set by someone fully qualified for this important work.
It is extremely important that the rate setter must be a good 
all-around mechanic and familiar with all types of machine tools. 
He must have the interest of the company at heart and yet be so 
tactful that he does not acquire the enmity of the worker. He must 
be a good judge of human nature and character, and be cool and 
courteous. He must be able to personally demonstrate that his 
allowed time is fair and can be surpassed by himself. He should 
also be able to detect the slightest movement of the worker made 
for the purpose of tricking him when making time studies. There 
are mechanics who know of many tricks which will fool the rate 
setter unless he is wide awake and thereby obtain a greater allowed 
time. Therefore, care must be taken in timing an operation per­
formed by the worker.
After several time studies have been made, checked and re­
checked, the allowed time is set and approved by the production 
superintendent and recorded on a standard operation write-up 
sheet. This sheet shows the part number, operation numbers, the 
routine of the movements of the material, the type of machines upon 
which the operations are to be performed, the allowed time per 
operation, the description of the movements necessary to perform 
the work, the kind and numbers of the tools and gauges used in per­
forming and measuring the work and the feeds and speeds.
N e c e s s i t y  o f  G ood I n s p e c t i o n  a n d  T i m e  A c c o u n t in g  S y s t e m s
Operation inspectors are employed in each department and are 
responsible for the passing of good materials and the recording of 
daily production records and spoiled work reports. The daily pro­
duction record is a report which shows the daily accomplishment of 
every employee working under the incentive system. It shows the 
employee’s name, shop order, part number and operation, the quan­
tity produced, allowed time per piece, total allowed time, actual 
time, time saved, the efficiency percentage and the result of inspec­
tion both as to quantity good and quantity spoiled.
Operation inspection expense is the largest portion of over­
head expense necessary to maintain the time work system, but it 
has been demonstrated that it pays for itself many times, by elimi­
nating labor on parts actually spoiled, the defects of which would 
otherwise not be discovered until a final inspection were made. For 
example, there are several parts such as cylinders, crankcases, cam­
shafts and crankshafts, used on automobiles which have many 
varied operations. If a part is spoiled on one of the first operations 
and not discovered at once, the succeeding operations are wasted. 
The value of this lost labor amounts to considerably more than the 
extra cost of operation inspection.
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The routine of the operations, as well as the amount of inspec­
tion necessary, is predetermined by the planning department.
Each department has a time clerk who is responsible for the 
count of the parts, as well as the ringing in by workers on the time 
clock at the start of jobs and the ringing out at the completion of 
jobs. It is quite necessary that a foreman or a time clerk inspect 
each job at the time the job ticket is punched “ in” to make sure 
the work has not been started, and it is necessary to inspect the 
work again when the job ticket is punched “ out” . Unless each 
order is checked at the start and finish it is possible for a worker, 
if he punches his own job card, to report more time on one job than 
he should and less on another which he might do, since he may be 
exceptionally efficient on one class of work and not as skillful on 
another kind. The following is an example of manipulated time in 
the case of a worker rated at 50 cents per hour:
A manipulation of job cards with the above result would not 
net the worker any considerable amount of extra earnings unless 
he had two work-orders, both lasting over a period of several days. 
He could not work this scheme very often on small orders because 
it would result in too many low efficiency performances, and the 
employees realize they cannot consistently have less than 100% 
ratings and retain their jobs. The example is shown to illustrate 
the necessity of protection against the manipulation of time, par­
ticularly in cases where an incentive system of this kind is started. 
Before the workers have had the advantage of the time study man’s 
instructions, regarding movements and lost motion, low efficiency 
is natural and should be allowed for during the rudimentary stage 
of development.
Another duty of the time clerk is to make sure that the number 
of pieces sent into the department correspond with the quantity 
called for on the production order routing card, and that the total 
number of parts rejected as defective, incorrect and spoiled, plus 
the quantity of good parts, agrees with the total originally received 
in the department. He is also responsible for checking the quan­
tities on job cards with quantities on the daily production record 
and the daily inspection report. The latter is a summary of each 
day’s inspection, showing good pieces passed, bad pieces rejected, 
and the reasons for rejection.
D a i l y  U s e  o f  t h e  E f f i c i e n c y  R e c o r d s
The daily production record which discloses each worker’s effi­
ciency and spoilage on each operation is in the hands of the produc­

























  False 
Effi­
ciency
Job 1 8.00 Hrs. 7.80 Hrs. 8 .50  Hrs. .20 Hrs. $ .10 103% 94%
Job 2 8.00 “ 5.20 “ 4.50 “ 2.80 “ 3.50 Hrs. 1.40 $1.75 154% 178%
Total 16.00 “ 13.00 “ 13.00 “ 3.00 “ 3.50 “  1.50 1.75 123%
day following the workers’ performances. The workers with less 
than 100% performance are asked for an explanation regarding 
their failure to do the work within the allowed time. Their excuses 
are recorded and future performances are checked with these ex­
planations. The reasons given by the workers sometimes reveal 
conditions which may never be discovered in any other manner. 
They may show that machines or fixtures are slightly out of order, 
perhaps not enough to spoil the parts being machined, but enough 
to retard production and to cause so much extra concentration on 
the operation that the movements which count the most are lost. 
No attention would be given by the worker to such a condition, if 
he were paid on day work basis, where he had no particular incen­
tive for increased production.
The writer recollects an excuse which was given by a worker 
for spoiling some cylinders. The spoilage, while not particularly 
large in any one day, was occurring constantly. Almost every day 
there was at least one cylinder spoiled on a boring operation. The 
workman stated that the jig was at fault. The foreman declared 
that only the man was to blame. The foreman made but a casual 
check of the jig, which showed nothing wrong. An investigation and 
study of the operation by the time study man and a careful check 
of the jig by a tool inspector brought out the fact that the worker’s 
contention was right. One of the clamping bolts was slightly worn 
but not enough to cause spoiled work, if enough pressure were used 
in tightening. Occasionally, the worker did not put this extra pres­
sure on the clamping bolt and the result was a scrap cylinder. The 
worker’s excuse in this instance, led to the designing and making of 
a better jig which paid for itself within a month by stopping the 
spoilage. It is apparent, therefore, that the workers’ excuses at 
times furnish the means for correcting faults. Another worker 
claimed that there was too much excess stock on castings. This 
fault was easily remedied by having the foundry change the pat­
terns. The saving here is obvious.
The performances of workers who show less than 100% effi­
ciency are carefully checked each day. They are given every chance 
to meet the allowed time and if they are habitually inefficient, they 
are tried on other work. If they then fail, they are dismissed. The 
success of the methods being discussed depends upon having better 
than 100% men in the shops, for they are then making above the 
market labor rate and are satisfied, and the company is at least pro­
ducing the minimum quantity scheduled. Men who continually 
range from 100 to 110%, when it is known that they could rate 
themselves higher, are studied carefully. They are usually the 
dubious ones who are wary of going the limit, fearing cuts in 
allowed time. These men have to be convinced that the company 
will rigidly carry out the wage rate agreement regarding cutting 
allowed time. When once satisfied that the company is honest in its 
own purpose, little further trouble with those workers is experi­
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enced. Special study is also given to workers who consistenly rank 
high in efficienecy. They are shifted to other jobs and tried out in 
many ways with the view of promoting them to foremanships. If 
they are very efficient on all classes of work, they may be just the 
men the company wants as foremen, to instruct workers how to 
attain greater production.
L a b o r  o n  S p o i l e d  W o r k  a n d  D e f e c t i v e  M a t e r i a l
When an operation inspector discovers work which is spoiled 
to the extent that it cannot be saved without additional operations 
being performed on it, he issues a spoiled work slip which shows the 
worker’s number, and then records his own number and signature 
on the slip. After the spoilage has been recorded on the daily 
inspection report, daily production record and routing card, respec­
tively, the spoiled work slip is sent to the factory accounting depart­
ment where the total time saved is reduced by the number of pieces 
spoiled times the actual time per piece. The worker, therefore, 
receives extra earnings only for those parts which are good. At 
times, parts do not pass inspection, but they may be made to pass 
the limits set with a slight additional operation. Such parts are 
called incorrect material and the worker is allowed to correct the 
parts on his own time by having this operation considered as part 
of his actual time. If the parts are found to be defective during 
machining, that is, if castings have blow holes or forgings are 
spotty, which are purely material defects and no fault of the ma­
chinist, and if the operation is completed before the defect is dis­
covered, the worker receives credit for the labor performed since 
it would be unfair to make him stand the burden of something be­
yond his control.
U s e  o f  E f f i c i e n c y  R e c o r d s  i n  N o r m a l  T i m e s
The method of determining proper hourly rates (hiring rates) 
is to divide the workers into three classes, A, B, and C with a mini­
mum and a maximum rate in each class.
In the chucking department where the machine tools used con­
sist of automatic and semi-automatic chucking machines, the classes 
and ratings might be as follows:
Class A  Class B Class C
Rate per H our Rate per H our Rate per H our
Minimum-Maximum Minimum-Maximum Minimum-Maximum
Jones and Lamson Operators 36 48 29 35 23 28
Libby 36 48 29 35 23 28
Gisholt 44 55 34 43 28 33
Potter and Johnson 36 48 29 35 23 28
New Britain 44  55 34 43 28 33
Acm e 36 48 29 35 23 28
Bullard 44 55 34 43 28 33
The figures are fictitious, but they show the basis of rating. 
Class C men on Jones and Lamson Chucking Machines would be 
rated from 23 to 28 cents per hour; class B men from 29 to 35 cents;
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and class A men from 36 to 48 cents, depending upon their effi­
ciency in the respective classes. A worker’s rate is increased in his 
class or the man is promoted to another class, according to the 
progress he has made, based on results as shown on his efficiency 
and deficiency records, consideration being given to attendance, 
efficiency, deportment, spoiled work and tardiness deficiency as 
well as production efficiency.
When a worker’s records, and observations of him, indicate 
that he is not attaining the standards set, he is given three warn­
ings that unless he shows improvement, he will be demoted to an­
other class or will have to accept a decrease in his wage rate in his 
present class. After the third warning, if no improvement is 
shown, he is advised of his demotion. In very few cases are more 
than one or two warnings necessary, for it is self-evident to the 
man that the company has an accurate check on his movements and 
performances, and he may realize that the only way he can obtain 
his reward is by strenuous and earnest labor. In cases where an 
application for an increase in a wage rate is made, the records are 
carefully studied and if no increase is warranted, the employee is 
advised as to the reason which is plainly evident on the efficiency 
and deficiency records. Very few requests for wage increases are 
received from employees, however, since each worker is auto­
matically increased in rate and class from his record of individual 
performances. In other words, his efforts are recorded and re­
warded automatically and he is not lost sight of. The procedure in 
use in many plants, today, is to raise individual rates at different 
times upon the foreman’s recommendation. This was the practice 
in the plants under consideration before the present incentive sys­
tem was established. At one time it was desirable to make a gen­
eral increase of rates. The employees’ record cards were carefully 
checked and it was discovered that there were good workmen who 
had been with the company a long time, whose rates had not been 
increased in three years, while some of their fellow-workers had 
received advances several times during that period. It was appar­
ent that the foreman had perhaps deliberately failed to recommend 
these men.
The following description of an actual occurrence will show 
the fairness of keeping employees’ performance records. A fore­
man made out and forwarded to the employment manager a request 
for discharge for one of his men, giving as reasons “ spoiling too 
much work” and “too much absence from work.” Reference to the 
employee’s records showed that his spoiled work deficiency was 
practically nothing and that he had lost no time in several months. 
The foreman’s request for discharge was refused and he was ad­
vised that dishonesty of this kind would not be tolerated. This 
foreman wanted to be boss and to discharge those men who did not 
come up to certain personal standards which he had set. He was 
soon convinced that the man’s individual performances were the
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first consideration and requests for discharges had to have a basic 
reason, which would stand investigation.
U s e  o f  E f f i c i e n c y  R e c o r d s  i n  D e p r e s s i o n  P e r io d s
Regardless of how much it hurts to lay off some workers it is 
necessary in times like the present to shut our eyes to sentiment and 
reduce the force. Obviously the ones retained should consist of 
those who are faithful, loyal and most efficient. How many firms 
employing large numbers of workmen can conscientiously state 
that they have kept their best men ? They cannot be sure without 
an intimate knowledge of each individual’s achievements. Prob­
ably the most common method used in reducing the force is to ask 
the foreman for a list of the men whose services in his opinion, 
could most easily be spared. It is undoubtedly true that there are 
many cases of worthy men who have been discharged on account of 
the antipathy of foremen. The workmen may have lacked tact and 
did not hesitate to show their disdain of the head of the depart­
ment. An employee may be independent or sensitive and go about 
his work without kowtowing to his foreman who may resent an 
independent spirit. Yet such a worker may be one of the most 
efficient and valuable men in the shop. Nevertheless, his is liable 
to be the first name on a foreman’s list of men to be laid off. How 
much fairer it is to both the workmen and the company to have the 
factory manager consider each man from the employee’s record of 
production, attendance, deportment, spoiled work and tardiness. 
Certainly the high efficiency men have helped to make the company 
successful. They should be retained as a reward for giving their 
best service and allowances should be made for temperament.
The workers who rank high and average best should form the 
nucleus of the larger organization that will be necessary when busi­
ness becomes normal again. Performance records should be re­
ferred to when business does increase, and when it becomes neces­
sary to employ more workers, the company will want to re-hire 
those employees who ranked highest when they were laid off. It is 
more satisfactory to refer to “ past performances” and to read the 
whole story than it is to consider several hundred men whose only 
ratings are recorded as first class, good or fair, those classifications 
perhaps having been made by a prejudiced foreman. How much 
better is one man than another who is rated good ? Perhaps it can­
not be determined except from the foreman’s memory. This 
method is not wholly reliable.
Generally speaking, managers have not given as much atten­
tion to the quality of workmen as they have to the quality of their 
tools. Before buying tool steel they insist on knowing the contents of 
carbon, manganese, silicon, phosphorus and sulphur, and the elastic 
limit, tensile strength, elongation, contraction and schleroscope 
hardness of the steel. Yet all that they know of the human being 
working with this steel, is that he is rated by his foreman as first
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class, good, fair or poor. A manager should know the varying 
efficiency ratings of all of these different classes of men, who should 
be analyzed as carefully and as positively as their tools are specified 
and inspected.
This paper may be interpreted as an appeal for justice to the 
worker which is not its purpose. Justice is impartial and means 
fairness to both workers and owners. It depends largely on co­
operation. The writer realizes, however, that co-operation does not 
mean only a union between the executives and the heads of the 
departments, but that it must be a union between the officials, the 
foremen and the largest unit of the organization—the workers— if 
success is to be assured. To attain that co-operation, rewards com­
mensurate with a man’s individual achievements as compared with 
the performances of his fellow workers must be paid.
The reader is asked to put himself in the shop-worker’s place. 
Acknowledge that he has all the aspirations to succeed that you 
have. Give him credit for being intelligent and of good education, 
as most skilled mechanics are. Then consider what you would do 
among hundreds of co-workers, on a day or hourly rate, with no 
chance to show your superiority as a mechanic. Would you strive? 
Perhaps you would for a time until you became disheartened and 
were convinced that your fellow-workers knew what they were 
talking about, when they quietly told you that it was useless to 
work harder than they did, as there was no personal reward for it, 
and that there was only one chance in a thousand of being recog­
nized for it. If, after months and years of extreme effort no recog­
nition came, other than your rating as a first-class worker, would 
you continue to strive? You would be convinced that the easiest 
way was the best, and you would admit that there was no incen­
tive to keep on. Your efficiency would drop off and you would join 
the rest of your co-workers in the “ Society of Discontent” or the 
“Apathy Club.” But, suppose you were advised that you would be 
paid on the basis of the time you saved for the company. Would 
you still continue to plod along? No, for your ambition would be 
stimulated. You would have something to work and compete for 
and the harder you worked the greater the reward you would re­
ceive. You would be happy in knowing that you received pay for 
what you individually accomplished, not on the principle of being a 
first-class worker, along with hundreds of other first-class workers, 
who were rated neither better nor worse than you. The spirit of 
rivalry would be re-established and you would feel that you could 
be a success in your own particular work where you had failed 
before.
The methods of securing effective work from labor as outlined 
in this article cannot be carried out unless workers are recognized 
and rewarded as individuals. Grouping labor according to hourly 
ratings is proper for a basis, provided that there are enough groups 
or classifications, as illustrated by the tables, shown under the
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heading “ Use of Efficiency Records in Normal Times.” An incen­
tive must be established which is based upon a standard of time, 
and all time saved should be credited to the workers. Performances 
must be recorded promptly. The entire method must be on a foun­
dation of fairness to both the company and the employee. As a 
result the company will have boosters, happy workers, permanent 
efficiency, and the workers will receive permanent earnings above 
the labor market rate.
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